doi: 10.18178/ijesd.2018.9.11.1124
A Game Theory Approach to Address Profit Conflicts in Environmental Regulation of Shale Gas Development in Chongqing of China
L. Liu1
, , ,
- 1State Key Laboratory of Coal Mine Disaster Dynamic and
- 2School of Resource and Environmental
Abstract
The shale gas industry is growing very fast inChina. Its potential environmental risks cause disputes amongdifferent stake holders. This paper used a game theory to studythe choice behaviors and their impact factors of environmentalregulators and production companies. The proposed model wasapplied to a shale gas project in Chongqing, China fordemonstrating a case study in fast developing regions. It turnsout that the pressure of environmental regulators is high; localresidents may have the tendency to neglect the environmentalrisk because of economic benefits. We propose theenvironmental management pays more attention on heavyregulations to over-standard discharge companies andstrengthen public participation by opening up more ways toparticipate.
Keywords
- Environmental regulators
- game theory
- production company
- shale gas
How to Cite
L. Liu, X. B. Jiang, X. Y. Lu, and S. Zhou, "A Game Theory Approach to Address Profit Conflicts in Environmental Regulation of Shale Gas Development in Chongqing of China," International Journal of Environmental Science and Development, vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 331-335, 2018. https://doi.org/10.18178/ijesd.2018.9.11.1124
Copyright & License
Copyright © 2018 by the authors. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).