doi: 10.7763/IJESD.2011.V2.116
A Game Theoretic Model for Trading Pollution Discharge Permits in River Systems
P. H. B. Beiglou is a M. Sc. Student at the School of Civil Engineering1
,
Reza Kerachian ,
M. H. Niksokhan is a Research Staff at the Water Research Institute2 ,
- 1University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
- 2Tehran, Iran
Abstract
In this paper, by combining a two-person nonzero-sum game, a multi-objective genetic algorithm and a cooperative game, we present a new game theoretic methodology for trading pollution discharge permits in rivers. A trade-off curve between the average treatment level of dischargers and fuzzy risk of low water quality is gained using the optimization model. Then, by using the two-person nonzero-sum game, the best non-dominated solution is chosen from the trade-off curve. The treatment costs of dischargers corresponding to the selected solution are reallocated among dischargers participating in a coalition and side payments are calculated. The proposed model is applied to the Zarjub River in Iran to illustrate its efficiency and applicability.
Keywords
- Trading Pollutant Discharge Permits
- Fuzzy Bi-matrix Game
- Water Quality
How to Cite
P. H. B. Beiglou is a M. Sc. Student at the School of Civil Engineering, Reza Kerachian, M. H. Niksokhan is a Research Staff at the Water Research Institute, and Pouyan Hatami Bahman Beiglou, "A Game Theoretic Model for Trading Pollution Discharge Permits in River Systems," International Journal of Environmental Science and Development, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 162-166, 2011. https://doi.org/10.7763/IJESD.2011.V2.116
Copyright & License
Copyright © 2011 by the authors. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).